亚历山大•汉密尔顿（Alexander Hamilton，1757-1804），美国首任财政部长，开国元勋之一，美国宪法的起草人之一。

导读注释者：王峥，英语语言文学博士，上海外国语大学讲师。发表学术论文8篇；专著一部；参编教材/词典3部；主持科研项目4项；教学获奖2次、学术获奖2次。

【精彩书摘】： 

No. 1: Hamilton 

AFTER an unequivocal1 experience of the inefficacy2 of the subsisting3 federal government, you are called upon to deliberate on a new Constitution for the United States of America. The subject speaks its own importance; comprehending in its consequences nothing less than the existence of the UNION, the safety and welfare of the parts of which it is composed, the fate of an empire in many respects the most interesting in the world. It has been frequently remarked that it seems to have been reserved to the people of this country, by their conduct4 and example, to decide the important question, whether societies of men are really capable or not of establishing good government from reflection and choice, or whether they are forever destined to depend for their political constitutions on accident and force. If there be any truth in the remark, the crisis at which we are arrived may with propriety5 be regarded as the era in which that decision is to be made; and a wrong election of the part we shall act may, in this view, deserve to be considered as the general misfortune of mankind. 

This idea will add the inducements6 of philanthropy7 to those of patriotism, to heighten the solicitude8 which all considerate and good men must feel for the event. Happy will it be if our choice should be directed by a judicious1 estimate of our true interests, unperplexed2 and unbiased by considerations not connected with the public good. 

But this is a thing more ardently to be wished than seriously to be expected. The plan offered to our deliberations affects too many particular interests, innovates upon too many local institutions, not to involve in its discussion a variety of objects foreign3 to its merits, and of views, passions, and prejudices little favorable to the discovery of truth. 

Among the most formidable4 of the obstacles which the new Constitution will have to encounter may readily be distinguished the obvious interest of a certain class of men in every State to resist all changes which may hazard5 a diminution6 of the power, emolument7 , and consequence of the offices they hold under the State establishments; and the perverted8 ambition of another class of men, who will either hope to aggrandize9 themselves by the confusions of their country, or will flatter themselves with fairer prospects of elevation10 from the subdivision of the empire into several partial confederacies than from its union under one government. 

It is not, however, my design to dwell upon11 observations of this nature. I am well aware that it would be disingenuous12 to resolve indiscriminately1 the opposition of any set of men (merely because their situations might subject them to suspicion) into interested or ambitious views. Candor2 will oblige3 us to admit that even such men may be actuated4 by upright intentions; and it cannot be doubted that much of the opposition which has made its appearance, or may hereafter make its appearance, will spring from sources, blameless at least if not respectable — the honest errors of minds led astray by preconceived jealousies and fears. So numerous indeed and so powerful are the causes which serve to give a false bias to the judgment, that we, upon many occasions, see wise and good men on the wrong as well as on the right side of questions of the first magnitude5 to society. This circumstance, if duly attended to, would furnish a lesson of moderation to those who are ever so thoroughly persuaded of their being in the right in any controversy. And a further reason for caution, in this respect, might be drawn from the reflection that we are not always sure that those who advocate the truth are influenced by purer principles than their antagonists. 

Ambition, avarice6 , personal animosity7 , party opposition, and many other motives not more laudable8 than these, are apt to operate as well upon those who support as those who oppose the right side of a question. Were there not even these inducements to moderation, nothing could be more ill-judged than that intolerant spirit which has at all times characterized political parties. For in politics, as in religion, it is equally absurd to aim at making proselytes9 by fire and sword. Heresies1 in either can rarely be cured by persecution2 . And yet, however just these sentiments will be allowed to be, we have already sufficient indications that it will happen in this as in all former cases of great national discussion. A torrent3 of angry and malignant4 passions will be let loose5 . To judge from the conduct of the opposite parties, we shall be led to conclude that they will mutually hope to evince6 the justness of their opinions, and to increase the number of their converts by the loudness of their declamations and by the bitterness of their invectives7 . An enlightened zeal for the energy and efficiency of government will be stigmatized8 as the offspring of a temper fond of despotic9 power and hostile to the principles of liberty. An over-scrupulous10 jealousy of danger to the rights of the people, which is more commonly the fault of the head than of the heart, will be represented as mere pretense and artifice11, the stale12 bait for popularity at the expense of public good. It will be forgotten, on the one hand, that jealousy is the usual concomitant13 of violent love, and that the noble enthusiasm of liberty is too apt to be infected with a spirit of narrow and illiberal distrust. On the other hand, it will be equally forgotten that the vigor of government is essential to the security of liberty; that, in the contemplation of a sound and wellinformed judgment, their interests can never be separated; and that a dangerous ambition more often lurks behind the specious1 mask of zeal for the rights of the people than under the forbidding appearance of zeal for the firmness and efficiency of government. History will teach us that the former has been found a much more certain road to the introduction of despotism than the latter, and that of those men who have overturned the liberties of republics, the greatest number have begun their career by paying an obsequious2 court to the people, commencing demagogues and ending tyrants3 . 

In the course of the preceding observations, I have had an eye, my fellow-citizens, to putting you upon your guard against all attempts, from whatever quarter, to influence your decision in a matter of the utmost moment to your welfare by any impressions other than those which may result from the evidence of truth. You will, no doubt, at the same time have collected from the general scope of them that they proceed from a source not unfriendly to the new Constitution. Yes, my countrymen, I own to4 you that after having given it an attentive consideration, I am clearly of opinion it is your interest to adopt it. I am convinced that this is the safest course for your liberty, your dignity, and your happiness. I affect5 not reserves6 which I do not feel. I will not amuse you with an appearance of deliberation when I have decided. I frankly acknowledge to you my convictions, and I will freely lay before you the reasons on which they are founded. The consciousness of good intentions disdains7 ambiguity8 . I shall not, however, multiply professions on this head. My motives must remain in the depository1 of my own breast. My arguments will be open to all and may be judged of by all. They shall at least be offered in a spirit which will not disgrace the cause of truth. 

I propose, in a series of papers, to discuss the following interesting particulars: — The utility of the UNION to your political prosperity — The insufficiency of the present Confederation to preserve that Union — The necessity of a government at least equally energetic with the one proposed, to the attainment of this object — The conformity of the proposed Constitution to the true principles of republican government — Its analogy to your own State constitution — and lastly, The additional security which its adoption will afford to the preservation of that species of government, to liberty, and to property. 

In the progress of this discussion I shall endeavor to give a satisfactory answer to all the objections which shall have made their appearance, that may seem to have any claim to your attention. It may perhaps be thought superfluous2 to offer arguments to prove the utility of the UNION, a point, no doubt, deeply engraved on the hearts of the great body of the people in every State, and one which, it may be imagined, has no adversaries3 . But the fact is that we already hear it whispered in the private circles of those who oppose the new Constitution, that the thirteen States are of too great extent for any general system, and that we must of necessity resort to separate confederacies4 of distinct portions of the whole.[1] This doctrine5 will, in all probability, be gradually propagated6 , till it has votaries7 enough to countenance1 an open avowal2 of it. For nothing can be more evident to those who are able to take an enlarged view of the subject than the alternative of an adoption of the new Constitution or a dismemberment3 of the Union. It will therefore be of use to begin by examining the advantages of that Union, the certain evils, and the probable dangers, to which every State will be exposed from its dissolution. This shall accordingly constitute the subject of my next address. 

PUBLIUS

【目录】： 

导 读

— 001 —

Note on Text

— 001 —

Contents of the Federalist

— 003 —

No. 1: Hamilton

— 021 —

No. 2: Jay

— 028 —

No. 3: Jay

— 035 —

No. 4: Jay

— 041 —

No. 5: Jay

— 047 —

No. 6: Hamilton

— 052 —

No. 7: Hamilton

— 061 —

No. 8: Hamilton

— 070 —

No. 9: Hamilton

— 078 —

No. 10: Madison

— 085 —

No. 11: Hamilton

— 096 —

No. 12: Hamilton

— 105 —

No. 13: Hamilton

— 113 —

No. 14: Madison

— 117 —

No. 15: Hamilton

— 124 —

No. 16: Hamilton

— 135 —

No. 17: Hamilton

— 142 —

No. 18: Madison (with Hamilton)

— 148 —

No. 19: Madison (with Hamilton)

— 156 —

No. 20: Madison (with Hamilton)

— 163 —

No. 21: Hamilton

— 169 —

No. 22: Hamilton

— 176 —

No. 23: Hamilton

— 188 —

No. 24: Hamilton

— 194 —

No. 25: Hamilton

— 201 —

No. 26: Hamilton

— 208 —

No. 27: Hamilton

— 216 —

No. 28: Hamilton

— 221 —

No. 29: Hamilton

— 226 —

No. 30: Hamilton

— 234 —

No. 31: Hamilton

— 241 —

No. 32: Hamilton

— 247 —

No. 33: Hamilton

— 252 —

No. 34: Hamilton

— 258 —

No. 35: Hamilton

— 265 —

No. 36: Hamilton

— 272 —

No. 37: Madison

— 281 —

No. 38: Madison

— 290 —

No. 39: Madison

— 300 —

No. 40: Madison

— 308 —

No. 41: Madison

— 318 —

No. 42: Madison

— 330 —

No. 43: Madison

— 339 —

No. 44: Madison

— 350 —

No. 45: Madison

— 359 —

No. 46: Madison

— 366 —

No. 47: Madison

— 374 —

No. 48: Madison

— 383 —

No. 49: Madison

— 390 —

No. 50: Madison

— 396 —

No. 51: Madison

— 400 —

No. 52: Madison

— 406 —

No. 53: Madison

— 412 —

No. 54: Madison

— 419 —

No. 55: Madison

— 425 —

No. 56: Madison

— 431 —

No. 57: Madison

— 436 —

No. 58: Madison

— 443 —

No. 59: Hamilton

— 450 —

No. 60: Hamilton

— 456 —

No. 61: Hamilton

— 463 —

No. 62: Probably Madison

— 468 —

No. 63: Probably Madison

— 475 —

No. 64: Jay

— 484 —

No. 65: Hamilton

— 491 —

No. 66: Hamilton

— 497 —

No. 67: Hamilton

— 504 —

No. 68: Hamilton

— 510 —

No. 69: Hamilton

— 515 —

No. 70: Hamilton

— 524 —

No. 71: Hamilton

— 534 —

No. 72: Hamilton

— 539 —

No. 73: Hamilton

— 546 —

No. 74: Hamilton

— 553 —

No. 75: Hamilton

— 557 —

No. 76: Hamilton

— 563 —

No. 77: Hamilton

— 569 —

No. 78: Hamilton

— 575 —

No. 79: Hamilton

— 584 —

No. 80: Hamilton

— 588 —

No. 81: Hamilton

— 596 —

No. 82: Hamilton

— 608 —

No. 83: Hamilton

— 613 —

No. 84: Hamilton

— 630 —

No. 85: Hamilton

— 643 —

The Constitution of The United States of America (Collated 

with The Federalist Papers)

— 651 —

术语汇编与简释

— 677 —